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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2446 
 ___________ 
 
AI HUA LI; BAIZHONG GONG; YUCHAO GONG, 
              Petitioners 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A089-224-752, A089-224-753 & A089-224-754) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2013 
 Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion file: January 10, 2013) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioners seek review of their orders of removal.  We will deny their petition. 
I. 
 Petitioners are citizens of China who concede removability.  The lead petitioner is 
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Ai Hua Li, and the other two (her husband and son) seek relief derivatively through her.  
Thus, we refer primarily to Li.  Through counsel, Li applied for asylum and other relief 
on the ground that Chinese officials forced her to have five abortions.  She listed the 
dates of those abortions as:  (1) February 1987; (2) May 24, 1991; (3) October 13, 1998; 
(4) August 20, 2003; and (5) February 18, 2005.  (A.R. 399-400.)  She submitted 
supporting documents, including two certificates stating that she had abortions on two 
other dates— August 23, 2000, and March 14, 2005.  (A.R. 334, 386.)  An Asylum 
Officer found Li not credible and referred her application to an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).   
 Li then retained new counsel and submitted an amended statement again claiming 
to have had forced abortions on the five dates originally specified.  (A.R. 208-09.)  She 
also submitted three more abortion certificates.  Two of them matched the 1998 and 2003 
dates in her statements.  (A.R. 269, 272.)  The third, however, contained still a different 
date—March 2, 1997.  (A.R. 323.)  (Li asserts that her former counsel submitted this 
certificate, but it appears in the record only under cover of her current counsel‟s 
submission of September 10, 2009.) 
 Li‟s testimony on direct examination was consistent with her written statements.  
When the Government confronted her with the discrepant certificates on cross-
examination, she admitted that she had received them from a friend in China and given 
them to her former counsel but (after some equivocation) claimed that the dates were 
wrong and that her former counsel had mistakenly submitted them.  Her current counsel 
requested that the IJ strike the discrepant certificates from the record, but the IJ declined 
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to do so and instead explained that he would consider their weight.  The IJ ultimately 
found Li not credible because: (1) the certificate for March 2, 1997, conflicted with her 
testimony that she was wearing an IUD at that time and did not become pregnant again 
until 1998; (2) the certificate purporting to document an abortion on August 23, 2000, did 
not match any of the dates to which she testified; and (3) her submission of the certificate 
for March 14, 2005, conflicted with her testimony that she did not have any certificate for 
2005.  Thus, the IJ concluded that Li had not shown that her abortions were involuntary 
or that she had them in the first place. 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed petitioners‟ appeal after 
finding no basis to disturb the adverse credibility determination.  In doing so, the BIA 
both summarized the reasons given above and added two of its own—that the Asylum 
Officer too found Li not credible and that other courts have recognized that the issuance 
of abortion certificates may actually undermine a claim that an abortion was involuntary.  
The BIA also concluded that the IJ had not erred in admitting the discrepant certificates 
into evidence.  Petitioners petition for review.
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II. 
 We read Li‟s brief to raise three arguments.  Each lacks merit.  First, Li argues that 
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 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We review the decision of the BIA 
but may look to the IJ‟s decision to the extent that the BIA deferred to it.  See Chen v. 
Att‟y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2011).  We review credibility determinations for 
substantial evidence and will not disturb them “„unless any reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‟”  Lin-Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  We review constitutional claims de 
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the IJ denied her due process in admitting the certificates into evidence.  We disagree.  
“Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in asylum proceedings, the test for 
admissibility of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and whether its use is 
fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law.”  Ezeagwuna, 325 
F.3d at 405 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).  The abortion certificates were 
clearly probative given the nature of Li‟s claim, and their admission did not violate due 
process.  Li herself obtained and submitted the certificates, the IJ gave her an adequate 
opportunity to explain them, and the IJ and BIA considered her explanation.  In addition, 
the IJ listed the exhibits at the beginning of the hearing and referred specifically by date 
to two of the discrepant certificates (A.R. 106-07), but Li did not object to them until the 
Government raised them on cross-examination.  Li has cited no authority requiring the 
exclusion of the certificates under these circumstances, and we are aware of none. 
 Second, Li argues that her explanation should have led the IJ and BIA to give the 
certificates “minimal to no weight.”  Li‟s explanation is that she obtained the certificates 
from a friend in China and provided them to her former counsel, who then mistakenly 
submitted them without checking the dates.  The BIA deemed this explanation 
implausible, and we cannot say that the BIA was required to accept it.  Li has raised no 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and her assertion that former counsel 
mistakenly submitted the discrepant certificates does not explain the existence of the 
discrepancies themselves.  Li speculates on review that Chinese authorities “most likely” 
                                                                                                                                                             
novo.  See Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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are responsible for the discrepancies given the passage of time, but she did not make that 
argument to the IJ or BIA and cites no evidence supporting it in any event. 
 Finally, Li argues that the Agency erred in basing its credibility determination 
“solely” on the discrepant certificates in the absence of an express finding that she knew 
them to be fraudulent.  Li relies on Yeimane-Berhe v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 907, 911 (9th 
Cir. 2004), and Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2008).  Unlike in those 
cases, however, the BIA here did not rely solely on the documents in question and instead 
relied on the other reasons identified above.  Li has not acknowledged or raised any 
challenge to those other reasons, so we have no occasion to address them.    
 In addition, Yeimane-Berhe and Corovic involved adverse credibility findings that 
were based solely on an alien‟s submission of a fraudulent document without any finding 
that the alien actually knew about the fraud.  The courts held that only with such a finding 
could the fraudulent nature of the documents undermine the alien‟s credibility (at least, in 
Corovic, when an alien expressly denies knowledge of the fraud).  This case presents a 
different situation because the adverse credibility finding was based, not on any 
determination that the discrepant certificates were fraudulent, but on the fact that they 
conflicted with Li‟s testimony.  These decisions thus do not call the Agency‟s credibility 
finding into question, and Li has cited no authority or evidence that does. 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
